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The Legislative Crisis
JOSÉ EDUARDO CARDOZO
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS that have taken place since the beginning of the 11th Century on the European continent resulted in the birth of new political and judicial institutions. It could not have been 
different. Economy, society, law and political power are always integrated in the 
universe of relations that constitute a specifi c historical moment.
This new institutionality did not spring from a model conceived by a 
genial thinker on a rainy night. Nor was it imposed on feudal rulers and kings 
overnight, by swords and cannonballs by a warrior general specializing in the 
strategies of war. It was built slowly, by facts and minds, over the long decline of 
the feudal system. The beginnings of this system were born in the relations that 
created the capitalist mode of production and imposed new ways of exercising 
power. Private dependency, constituted by the stepped system of service 
characteristic of the Middle Ages, was put in question by a gradually increasing 
process of centralized power. Individuals, day after day, became more subject to 
their kings. The power of the king began to no longer stand 
on dependencies derived from personal property, birth, wedding or 
sale, but from the power of his military and police. The sovereign was 
to no longer exclusively represent their princes or counts, but to protect 
the interests of all people who would submit to his power. Beside the 
dependence of the offi cers or servants to their masters, a relationship of 
dependency, based on public law gradually developed between the king 
and his people. (Fleiner-Gerster, 2006, p.181) 
Historical changes dictated growing needs imposed by the beginning 
of the capitalist mode of production that created this new institution. The free 
fl ow of capitalist economic relations demanded the abolition of slavery and 
“formal equality” in relations between humans, so that blue blood was no longer 
a precondition for the exercise of power. The relations of dependency between 
the “new rulers” and ordinary people ceased to be based on tradition or “divine 
power”. New forms of legitimation of power were born as a result of the demands 
of “social governance.” 
It was within this historical context that the “Modern State” was 
born: a state characterized as a unit of power exercised over a people living in 
a territory in which this same power is imposed in a rational and centralized 
manner, confi guring itself, from an external point of view, as independent and 
autonomous, i.e. as sovereign. People, territory and sovereignty, therefore, are its 
essential elements and shapers. 
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As part of its structure, the affi rmation of the primacy of law as an 
instrument of collective will and confi gurator of the “public interest” as well as 
the adoption of the tripartite theory of state power gave birth to the concept 
of rule of law. To some extent a synthesis of the thoughts of Montesquieu and 
Rousseau, this rule of law, in a sovereign manner, within its territory, exerts its 
power over the people, but with respect to the limits imposed by the laws that 
are produced. Within it a person or a group of people can not institutionally 
concentrate power. Therefore,  its constituent parts should be  distinct organic 
complexes, autonomous and independent, acting in the interest of harmony,  
producing laws (the Legislative), executing them (the Executive) and also judging 
“fairly” those who transgress them(the Judiciary).
The passing of this model of the State from the world of ideas to the 
world of facts derives from the transformative actions of the North American 
Declaration of Independence in 1776, to the birth of the Constitution of 
the United States, and the blood shed on French soil during the bourgeois 
Revolution of 1789. It has since then become the model adopted by many 
countries of the world.
At the beginning of the 21st century, however, we are undergoing times of 
profound transformations. Time seems to run faster.  Every day the technological 
revolution produces changes of habit and behavior. By not having the speed of the 
internet, newspapers no longer deliver the “Latest News.”  Virtual relationships 
have begun to develop new ways of living and love relationships. In the stock 
exchange, operators’ cries are replaced by electronic auctions that every moment 
securely perform thousands of business operations. It is no longer necessary to go 
to stores for shopping; banking operations no longer require a trip to the bank. 
The telephone goes with us as though it were an extension of our bodies. With 
it we speak to people on the opposite side of the globe, listen to music, watch 
television, do calculations, know where we are via satellite, make recordings, take 
photographs, receive the news and stock market quotations on-line.
These changes also affect other aspects of life. In a globalized world, an 
economic crisis in one country immediately affects the planet. Capital moves 
dizzily, back and forth, bringing U.S. dollars to one side of the world to the other 
at the speed of light. Stable banks break and conglomerates are formed overnight. 
The market, the old place where business was done, has become a metaphysical 
entity, unstable, intensely sensitive, whose incomprehensible essence intimidates 
governments and embodies an angel or a demon. 
Given this, will it still be possible to believe that political institutions will 
remain unaffected by this new historical reality?  That human relations, economic 
life and forms of social interaction are being transformed at a breakneck pace and 
institutions will remain untouched?
Without the gift of foresight, but with the ability to read signs and draw 
conclusions, I believe not. There are objective indicators that the Law of the 
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State, at least in its classic, bourgeois formulation, can no longer respond to the 
impositions dictated by this new moment of history. One of these indicators 
seems to be the crisis which, world wide and particularly in Brazil, has affected 
one of its sustaining pillars: the Legislature.
The Crisis of the Legislature: Dysfunctional and 
Unrepresentative to the Demands of the Present Historical Time
World wide, Parliament is experiencing a crisis and loss of institutional 
legitimacy. 
This situation is paradoxical. Nowadays, when some countries are living 
under the bayonets and guns of a dictatorship, strong, free parliaments, with 
secure constitutional guarantees, are seen as necessary for the guarantee of 
freedom and democracy. At such moments, fragile and frightened, society 
returns to the past and to the historical origins of parliamentary life. It recalls 
in the full dimensions what gave rise to the Parliament in medieval England, 
as a major source for the limitation of power. A free Parliament, constituted 
of elected representatives, is defended as an indispensable institution for 
establishing limits to the exercise of power, for respect for plurality of opinions 
and for the formulation of legitimate, fair and balanced State policies. 
When dictators fall,  although, like the phoenix, democratic life is reborn, 
little time is required for Parliament to come to be seen as an unproductive, 
slow, parasitic institution occupied by useless, inept or hypocritical “politicians, 
”true leeches that live off the Treasury greedily gorging on privileges and 
“perks” that they can gain from their pompous and “useless” power. What, 
fi nally, do your “excellencies” serve? Implicitly or explicitly this is the question 
that runs through the streets, to houses, bars, barber shops and hairdressers 
when democracy is in the air.  “For nothing” or “to steal,” answer the “sincere” 
who say what think. “Men should not be confused with the institutions,” 
answer the convinced democrats or those who, out of intellectual fashion, 
fearing to deviate from the “politically correct” in times of freedom, humbly 
modulate their feelings and understanding, at least until dictatorships return to 
fashion. 
It is true that this pejorative assessment in relation to Parliament is not 
uniform around the world. There are countries where the democratic and 
cultural roots are stronger. And in them the criticism is subtler and not even 
superfi cially is directed toward the need for eradication of the institution. But 
in others the feeling of aversion is so strong that even the most democratically 
oriented person cannot presume to imagine the possibility of the voting masses 
coming to argue for the extinction of parliamentary institutions. In the end, 
in such cases, the historical possibility of a dictatorship being democratically 
approved by popular vote is real. A democrat from our time might be forced 
to acknowledge, against his will, that “Democracy must have as a limit, always 
whenever necessary, the non-democratic expression of its own existence”. 
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Whether it is or is not true in general, a common criticism of Parliament 
concerns the slowness of its decisions. There are even those who propose, taking 
as true the classic affi rmation that the production of laws should be compared to 
the production of sausages, that the effi ciency of a Legislative House ought to be 
measured by the number of laws that it approves. “The more laws that are approved, 
the better for the people,” in the same way that “the more sausages produced, 
the better for the owner of the factory” seems to be the rationale on which this 
curious measurement of parliamentary productivity is based. It is clear that this 
understanding follows from the maxim “every new law is a good law,” when in 
truth any less mercantilist or “sausage” way-of-thinking of legislative life shows us 
the opposite. Many times, for social life it would be better not to pass any law. And 
for the public interest, the forces and energy spent so that nothing will alter at the 
time could be more productive than the approval of certain “sausage laws.”
The fact is, however, that Parliamentary decision-making processes are slow. 
And, we can say in defense of the obvious, that it is entirely natural that they should 
be. Any and all decision-making process that travels so many varied collegial roads 
to its constitution is much slower. It always requires debate, respect for different 
opinions, development of convictions and decisions by majorities.  Actually it is 
a natural law, intrinsic to the facts of life, that democratic decisions will be much 
slower than authoritarian decisions. A despot or a dictator can decide whatever 
he wants, as quickly as desired. He consults whoever he wants to, if and when he 
desires to hear before deciding. For him the distance between wanting and the 
expediting of an act of government is only the distance between the brain and the 
hand that holds the pen that signs the signature. There is no divergent thinking, no 
need to convince anyone else or form a majority. The only obstruction that could 
exist is a lack of ink in the pen.
Indeed, the very logic that induced thinkers to suggest that the law 
should be approved by Parliament, a collegial body that decides in accord with 
the opinion of the majority, also suggests that the execution of the law should be 
undertaken by a hierarchical Power such as an army. In this manner of thinking 
the law is the greater act, the act which restricts social behavior. For this “no one 
can do, or exempt (him or herself) from doing something unless forced by law” 
(principle of legality), a law that should be a decision approved by a majority of 
the representatives elected by society. It demonstrates the collective will and the 
public interest has been reached.  On the other hand, its mere implementation 
should be understood as simple compliance with what has been already 
decided by the majority of representatives of the community by a person who 
is conventionally known as a “public offi cial.” As already said, someone who is 
simply an administrator by defi nition “is without proprietary interest.” The public 
administrator is not a “proprietor” of the“res public”or owner of the public interest. 
The “proprietorship” is the people, i.e. those people living in the territory of a 
sovereign state and in the name of which “all of the power is exercised.”
And thus is our system. And so that is how the problems dictated by modern 
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reality appears, among them the “slow decision-making” of parliaments. 
Indeed, in fast moving times such as ours, where problems are born from 
events that reverberate within seconds to other continents the requirement for 
rapid decision-making is increasing. Today economic authorities must decide 
immediately what to do in the economies of their countries on the daily emerging 
facts, health authorities must take immediate preventive measures to prevent or 
minimize outbreaks that can be generated in another corner of the world, and 
the police need legal means and effective instruments to combat new criminal 
procedures that appear daily. There are hundreds of everyday situations that a 
government has to decide on the spot with agility and speed far superior to that 
which was demanded in the past. The time to pass a law can be fatal for the 
preservation of dominant interests in society.
It is for this reason that so many Constitutions are prepared so that the 
exercise of a legislative act does not reside solely concentrated in the hands of the 
Legislature. A typical example is our “provisional measures” which, although not 
“laws” in the strict sense of the term, are dictated by the Chief Executive and 
have legal force equivalent to those enactments. 
Naturally, this condition that requires immediate decisions, dictated by the 
new times, have, around the world, been placing  the decision-making process in 
the hands of the Executive with a substantial loss of policy-making space for the 
Legislature. Increasingly parliamentary procedures are less able to respond to the 
circumstances posed by modern life and the demands of a rapid, integrated, on-
line historical reality. A legislatures’ natural, inherently slow democratic process 
is the result of its own plural, procedural and ritualistic composition, moving in a 
direction opposite to the historical dynamic of social facts. 
There are however, cases in which the “Legislative space” is unable to 
be claimed by the Executive branch, but instead is assumed by the Judiciary. 
Drawing on legal institutions for fi xing the interpretation of the rules operative in 
many countries, judges, under the guise of “interpreting the law,” assume the role 
of “legislature”. Under the rhetoric of “pronouncing the law,” “create” the law, 
without having this right.
This problem of legislative power being claimed by other branches has 
often been analyzed only through superfi cial consideration of the problems of a 
Parliament or a legislature. It is true that, at times, these problems are aggravated 
by specifi c and time-based crises. However, what cannot be lost sight of is that 
the problem is not merely subjective, owing to certain parliamentarians. It is an 
objective, systemic problem that is dictated by changing times. The march of 
history undermines the traditional Parliament and the principle of democratic 
legality. Increasingly, calls into question the rule of law, its pillars of support and 
the bourgeois conception of democracy. 
Another systemic problem, imposed by the historical moment in which 
we live, refers back to the clash between representative democracy and the 
instruments of direct democracy.
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Traditionally, the most common legitimizing argument we hear for the 
election of representatives of the people for the approval of its laws is the real 
impossibility, the diffi culty, of citizens directly express their will in the adoption 
of standards that should direct their conduct. Citizens can not physically meet in 
assemblies to decide what should be their laws. Therefore, representatives must be 
elected in order to, in assembly, decide the general rules that will govern social life. 
Therefore we think to ourselves. With high security standards 
technological change may soon allow citizens to vote directly from their own 
computers for the formulation of laws. Casual discussions and interactive debates 
can be conducted on the Internet whenever desired. Direct democracy, exempting 
intermediaries (i.e. parliamentarians) will be able to be exercised with no 
diffi culties.
The question will then be: why should there be a Parliament if the people 
can directly express their will for the approval of its laws?
It is perhaps possible in a philosophical exercise or by great perception 
to imagine that “Parliament,” in fact, may be expendable in the development of 
democratic decision-making in the State of the future. Its existence within the 
very premises of a Democratic State of Law will then be questioned and will no 
longer be a requirement imposed from a prior model, but an option. 
It is said that the need for deep and detailed studies on various matters, 
free from the momentary passions dictated by common sense and the shifting 
waves of volatile public opinion, can never eliminate the management of the state 
and the existence of elected representation in future democracies. To a certain 
extent I tend to think so. However, it is inevitable that with time such questions 
will emerge. Questioning that, by not being merely speculative, can lead to 
profound changes in our way of experiencing democracy. 
What garb will the Legislative Branch then wear, with the changes to 
come? How will the systemic democratic defi cit be fed that will be brought about 
by the usurpation of the functions of the Legislature by the Executive or the 
Judiciary (or both) in the State in the 21st century? 
Certainly, we can now say, recalling Hamlet, “that is the question.”
The Crisis of the Brazilian Legislative Branch: The Inadequacy 
of the Political System
In addition to the general problems addressed here, the crisis of the 
Legislature in Brazil is further aggravated by the specifi c situations generated by 
our political system. 
In the fi rst place it must be noted that our proportional election system is 
not only anachronistic, but also presents undemocratic deviations. Anachronistic 
because, contrary to times of republican demands and impersonality, the whole 
election process is based on the vote that the voter gives to the candidate as 
a person. Greater value is thereby placed on the personal characteristics of the 
candidate than on their political, ideological and program-based vision. 
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The consequence is obvious. Since in our system the electoral contest by 
proportional vote is spread among a high number of candidates to be chosen for 
each vacancy within the larger universe of voters who choose them, the diffi culty 
of gaining personal knowledge of the candidates’ ideas inevitably results in a 
major dose of depoliticization of choice. The vote for the future parliamentarian 
is made by “beauty”, out of “sympathy,” for “artistic” or “sporting” gifts. The 
presentation and knowledge of the candidate as a person by the media are 
almost always the decisive electoral lines for a choice, due to the suppression of 
debate and the general ignorance of the different “personalities” running for the 
Legislature vacancies.
Naturally reducing the selection criteria to these kinds of personal 
“attributes” or to the processes of media exposure produces bizarre and 
questionable election results, at least in terms of what, in theory, could be 
considered a “good Parliamentary representation.” 
Furthermore this personalizing process strengthens the personal relations 
between voters and the elected while weakening the formation of political parties 
with their ideological and programmatic identity. Therefore, this patronage 
becomes fertile ground for the “process of capturing votes” to fl ourish. 
Perhaps this is one of the main reasons why in Brazil we have so many 
“legends” and so few political parties in the proper sense of this expression, which 
causes serious problems for the Parliament and governance. The formation of 
“parliamentary majorities,” indispensable to any government, nearly always, fails 
to go beyond understandings or pledges between parties. It is the “individual” 
needs of parliamentarians that are addressed so that, by occupying “positions of 
power in the state bureaucracy” (recommending positions in the Executive) and 
receiving the benefi ts of administrative actions that are focused on caring for their 
electoral “patrons,” or even negotiating “non-republican” advantages, they may 
come to have good conditions for their future electoral contests.
Therefore, note that this “personalized” electoral reality also facilitates 
democratic deviance. Although voters choose the person they want to elect, under 
current electoral law votes are tallied by party affi liation (or coalition) in order to 
defi ning the number of seats they will occupy. Seats are fi lled based on the order 
of the top vote-getting candidates in each party. Where an elector may vote for 
the personage of one candidate, without having considered the candidate’s party, 
another candidate from the same party, with nothing else in common, may in 
theory come to be elected. 
This fact further will be even more exasperating if we note that the 
majority of Brazilian voters, possibly ignore this manner of distributing seats in 
Parliament, not knowing they can vote for a candidate and elect another who they 
would never have voted for. 
And secondly, we must emphasize that to a large extent this electoral 
system generates the structural corruption we have in our country. The 
campaigns for the Parliament, to the extent that they are conducted individually, 
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require each candidate to chase after funding for the fi nancial resources. Of 
course, these resources are decisive for the election. The more money a candidate 
has, the greater the possibility of emerging victorious in this widespread universe 
of competitors.
Therefore, the abuse of economic power and the lack of parity among 
candidates are an inevitable result of this system. The lack of effective oversight of 
the entire electoral system is a reality. And thus was born the promiscuous bonds 
between donors and candidates. Making electoral donations in exchange for 
favors or future advantages is a reality in our political life. 
This system provides incentive for advantageous corruption scandals 
and, consequently, a tarnished image of Parliament. In times of free press and 
independent and republican state bodies investigating acts of misconduct and 
election aberrations, a subterranean reality always emerges. And when the mantle 
of a hypocritical system does not cover over its hidden parts, the crisis fl ourishes.
Conclusion 
The time has come to go beyond  common sense in discussing the 
crisis that now affects the parliamentary institutions, both in the world, and, 
in particular, Brazil. The Manichean approach that classifi es members of the 
“political class” in terms of “good” and “evil” can, on the one hand, trigger a 
higher level of primary awareness by voters, while on the other hand it prevents 
knowledge of deeper causes of problems. It is clear that “bad” Parliamentarians 
should be banned by the forfeiture of their offi ce or from voting. It is quite clear 
that a discussion, even put in Manichean terms, still has the advantage of the fact 
that it demolishes the pathetic vision of “steals but does” or the idiotic dogma 
that” every politician is a parasite, a thief, or both.” But this is not suffi cient. 
The crisis of Parliament has deeper causes. It should be discussed in 
sunlight, radically, from knowledge of the contradictions generated by the 
current historical reality. It is the full understanding of its roots, with all of their 
ramifi cations, which will allow us to build a democratic solution for the future. 
A new political system? A new Parliament? A new structure of the Powers of the 
State? A new democratic State? 
History, of course, will tell. 
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